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A Fatal Defect of  Interim Administration? Case Application: 
Kosovo 
 
Peter Ondrovič1 
 
Abstract: Some studies have suggested that the interim administration (IA) mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) has failed in its aim 
to transform the society and contributed to a complicated completion of  the mission. In this article, primarily reports 
of  the UN General-Secretary (SG) on UNMIK are analyzed to answer the question posed in the title. Important 
development points during the reporting periods that cover key research areas such as security, political cooperation, 
Northern Kosovo, ethnic tensions, and violence are analyzed. The transitional process and the mode of  transition have 
been influenced by three important factors that significantly undermined the aim of  interim administrators to achieve 
benchmarks. Moreover, conflicting ethnic interest has emerged as the most influential factor that has had a serious 
detrimental impact on the mode of  transition. The IA has failed to transform individual interests that are still very 
deeply rooted in the political system and in society. Present diplomatic achievements are still strongly imperiled by a 
deep hostility in the region, largely because of  a chronic ignorance on the part of  administrators of  the intensity of  
conflicting ethnic interests. To ensure security in the area an international presence will probably be needed in Kosovo 
for a very long time.  
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1. Introduction. Research Design and Methodology 
There are several limitations to a conceptual definition and theoretical understanding of  the modern 
concept of  IA. These limits are unclear due to a lack of  comprehensive studies dealing with the 
broader metatheoretical impact of  the contemporary application of  modern IA models on the 
transformed societies. A vacuum relating to a general understanding of  the problem of  IA itself  
complicates further utilization of  the model, which is on many occasions influenced by a number of  
actors and interests. Thus, the impacts of  such elements on the whole model tend to spiral. It can 
run in different and unpredicted directions that can only be correctly measured with difficulty. The 
structure of  the model is therefore affected by particular results of  political, strategic and economic 
concerns that might lead to a hybrid nature of  the model and consequently to the model’s 
deformation. 
Present understanding of  the model of  IA and its internal dynamics is still limited. Conventional 
methods and techniques offer a narrow application. Thus, there is at present no consensus on 
providing a universal definition for an IA model. This work is based on an empirical and analytical 
approach to studying mostly primary and then secondary sources. The approach is based 
fundamentally on qualitative research, the aim of  which is to interpret collected information on the 
one hand and to study the level of  regular interactions driving inner deviations inside the IA model 
applied in Kosovo on the other. The findings were collected by means of  several research methods.
                                                          
1 Contact: Department of  International Relations and European Studies, Faculty of  Social Studies, Masaryk University, 
Joštova 10, 602 00 Brno; e-mail: 366465@mail.muni.cz 
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The frontline is covered by a descriptive method. The description is used to interpret the facts that 
are further combined with an analytical method. The analyses are applied to a deeper examination of  
the collected data and to studying reciprocity between cause and consequence. Finally, a deductive 
method is also applied. The purpose of  the method is to provide a more comprehensive 
interpretation of  the findings that will be set into a broader framework. 
The key aspect of  this work is to reach a deeper understanding of  the limits of  the model as 
well as to analyze the flows driving resonance inside the model. This paper, together with two 
previous articles2 will form a part of  a larger dissertation. The purpose of  this work is not to pay 
general attention to a definition of  IA itself  or its theoretical constructions, or even to give a general 
interpretation of  phenomena. Rather, the aim of  this work is to focus on a study of  internal factors 
and elements that have a crucial impact on the system of  acceleration inside the model of  transition 
and the mode of  dynamic in the transition. This theoretical framework is subsequently applied to the 
model of  IA in Kosovo. The findings of  this work present an important dataset that will serve also 
for a further work directed towards a final analysis of  the effectiveness of  the model of  IA in 
Kosovo.3 
This paper is based on the following hypothetical construction: 
An IA in Kosovo neglected the basic determinant of  the roots of  hostility and partially failed in 
establishing a suitable definition for the primary conceptual transformation schema. The system 
ignored a crucial deviational factor inside the model, which resulted in retrogressions of  internal 
transformation flows and contributed to a complicated schema for the consolidation of  the country.  
The construction is subsequently supported by the following questions.  
Could Resolution 1244 itself  in some way have been accountable for an internal deviation in the 
mode of  transition and contributed to obstructing the implemented schema? 
Were the environment and the strategy of  transition able to transform individual interests into a 
collective identity? 
To what extent did the domestic communities in Kosovo modify the unfavorable conditions 
undermining the mode of  the transitional system?  
The work is divided into two parts. The first part pays attention to the trajectory accompanying 
the process of  a regime change. The focus is on the study of  weak points of  the mode of  transition 
in Kosovo. The second part analyzes both the process of  interaction and the impact of  the 
international environment and domestic interests in transforming society.  
In conducting research for this paper, I relied on four categories of  basic source material. Firstly, 
my analysis focused primarily on the progress reports of  the UN SG concerning the transitional 
administration (TA) mission in Kosovo. The method of  analysis rested on process-tracing within this 
case in order to determine the effect that the interplay between local, national and international 
                                                          
2 The first article “Failing Blueprint? The Indispensable Crossroad of  a TA in Kosovo” was published by the Central 
European Political Studies Review. The article deals with the question of  an alternative consolidation for the Kosovo–
Serbia dispute as a result of  the collapsing schema of  the IA in Kosovo. The following article “Territorial Autonomy: 
Successful Blueprint for Northern Kosovo?” is currently under external review process for Communist and Post-
communist Studies 
3 It is planned to publish this paper in conjunction with the present article. However, due to time limitations, it can be 
deemed probable that the findings will be directly integrated into my final thesis without being previously publishing. 
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factors has had on deviation inside the mode of  transition. My second source was the world’s most 
influential newspapers that cover news in a professional way. Thirdly, I analyzed official websites of  
the government of  the Republic of  Serbia and the government of  the Republic of  Kosovo. My 
study focused primarily on official statements and positions towards particular disputes. The fourth 
source of  information was specialized publications, professional articles and papers. This source 
provided a particular insight into relevant approaches and views dealing with the problem of  
transitions and consequently into the modes of  implementing strategies.  
  
2. The Mode of  Transition and Conflicting Ethnic Interests 
One of  the particular key goals of  contemporary international IA missions is the process of  state 
building. “Transitional administration denotes the less common type of  operation, in which these 
ends [quasi-governmental activities such as electoral assistance, assistance with human rights, rule of  
law technical assistance, security sector reform, and certain forms of  development assistance – all 
directed towards constructing and reconstructing institutions of  governance capable of  providing 
citizens with physical and economic security] are pursued by assuming some or all of  the powers of  
the state on a temporary basis” (Chesterman 2005: 5). The complexity of  modern TAs can be seen 
in a number of  activities that accompany particular transitions phases. The process of  transition 
from an old regime to a nascent one is followed by a number of  decisions and strategies that fully 
influence the path of  the changing political system. Doyle argues that “[E]ffective transitional 
authority must take into account levels of  hostility and factional interests. Whether it in fact does so 
depends on strategic design and international commitment” (Doyle, Sambanis 2006: 63). A large 
number of  state-building activities force the interim administrators to reform the political system and 
implement democratic norms and practices into the transforming system. In particular, this pertains 
to international efforts to develop a democratic regime, one whose rules, procedures and institutions 
allow for regular and open competition for access to political power, and guarantee the broad range 
of  political and civil liberties that are necessary for such open competition to take place (Tansey 
2009: 4). 
The process of  transition can occur in many ways and in a huge number of  possible guises 
involving similar strategies or political actors. The rationale behind such activities is that establishing 
zones of  stable peace depends not only upon the provision of  military security through the wider 
tasks given to peacekeepers, but also the creation of  function liberal polities, economies and societies 
(Bellamy, Williams, Griffin 2004: 255). It can be progressed by an almost limitless number of  
trajectories with a different application of  transitional strategies. The term transition in democratic 
regime change has come to denote “an undefined period between the launching of  the process of  
dissolution of  an authoritarian regime at the outset and the installation of  some form of  democracy 
or the return to some form of  authoritarian rule, or the emergence of  a revolutionary alternative at 
the end” (Shain, Linz 1995: 128). A transition process is always quite a big challenge that exercises all 
parties involved in the process: “Achieving a sustainable peace could broadly be conceived as a 
triangle, matching the right level and kind of  international capacities to the degree of  material 
destruction and to the political hostility that the civil war had wrought” (Doyle, Sambanis 2006: 303). 
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The domestic environment always comprises, and international administrators always face a different 
mix of  interests of  actors directly or indirectly involved in a transition. The mode of  transition is 
fully conditioned by a number of  variables deeply rooted in both domestic and international 
environments.  
 
3. Case Application – One 
The UNMIK is a multi-structured mission of  the UN. In spite of  its complexity, the transition 
process in Kosovo has uncovered some fluctuations that have a quite radical impact on the mode of  
transition itself. In some ways, the international community has overlooked an important factor that 
has had a seriously detrimental effect on the implemented strategies. The existence of  strengthening 
and conflicting ethnic interests has been continuously ignored despite a large amount of  evidence 
indicating some resonance in the mode of  transition. The strategy of  the international community 
regarding the mode of  transition in Kosovo has been based on a belief  that an application of  
democratic principles can resolve the roots of  the conflict and eventually lead to local ownership. It 
was believed that a system based on quotas for both parties – Kosovo Serbs and Albanians – and 
their participations in the newly-created institutions for provisional governance would diminish 
tensions inside the society. Moreover, the interim administrators were persuaded that incorporating 
norms of  good governance would allow reconciliation and the future coexistence of  the majority 
and the minority.  
On the contrary, conflicting ethnic interests have continuously undermined the situation and 
contributed to serious complications with respect to achieving benchmarks. The lack of  a clear 
strategy dealing with this problem consequently led to the limited participation of  members from 
both ethnic communities in the newly-created institutions for provisional self-governance. Moreover, 
the resulting vacuum further intensified violence in the society. The term conflicting ethnic interests in 
Kosovo demonstrates a quite interesting paradox. It is related to a different perception of  the future 
coexistence of  Kosovo Serbs and Albanians side by side in the territory. Both parties, in fact, strive 
towards dominance; historically, there have been initiatives on both sides since the fall of  the 
Ottoman Empire to establish their particular dominance in the region. (Jureković 2006: 79–131). The 
society continuously exhibits a tendency within which both ethnic communities still have, in their 
eyes, legitimate reasons for continuing to struggle for supremacy. In 2005, Kai Eide reported slight 
progress in this area and the importance of  intensifying the application of  security standards in 
accordance with UN Resolution 1244 request for a multi-ethnic society. Regrettably, however, little 
has been achieved to create the foundation for a multi-ethnic society. As the UN report states, the 
Kosovo leaders and the international community should take urgent steps to correct this grim 
picture (S/2005/635, 2005: para. 44). The Progress Reports of  the UN SG on UNMIK clearly 
indicate that in spite of  the international presence and its keen efforts, conflicting ethnic interests 
have persisted. The situation concerning the existence of  different individual interests was worsened 
by the announcement of  the unilateral Declaration of  Independence and recently by the adoption of  
the EU-brokered landmark accord. Since the Declaration of  Independence, participation of  the 
minority in public affairs has diminished: “Kosovo Serbs with the support of  the Serbian authorities 
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have expanded their boycott of  the institutions of  Kosovo (…) This expanded boycott has not been 
uniform, however. Although Kosovo Serb civil servants have stopped coming to work in 
municipalities where they make up either a majority, or a significant proportion, of  the population 
(…) they have continued to work in municipalities where they remain a small minority (…) At the 
central level, leaders of  Kosovo Serb political parties have continued to have informal contacts with 
UNMIK and the Government of  Kosovo” (S/2008/211, 2008: para. 8).  
The continuing existence of  parallel administrative structures has presented another problem. 
Parallel structures were reported at the national level as well as at the level of  municipalities 
principally in the areas of  education, health and administrative services (S/2002/1126, 2002: para.7). 
The plurality of  society has presented a very important complication with respect to integrating all 
members of  communities into one social identity. During the IA, international actors have extended 
their efforts to change the political dynamics to provide an incentive to dismantle parallel structures 
and to encourage all communities to participate in join institutions (S/2002/1126, 2002: para. 8).  
There has been continuous discrimination against ethnic groups in Kosovo, predominantly 
against the Kosovo Serbs and Roma with regard to employment opportunities in the private sector. 
The issue of  property has become a major concern. Language policy has still not reached the set 
standards. Kosovo institutions have had a problem in finding the required number of  language 
interpreters to ensure equal access for all members of  the community to public services 
(S/2006/707, 2006: Annex 1). The discrimination against ethnic groups persists deeply in the society 
and incidences of  it can be observed in both directions – intraethnic and interethnic. Serious human 
rights violations have been regularly reported during the presence of  the IA in Kosovo. Most of  the 
violations are based on ethnicity. Kosovo Serbs, Roma and Slavic Muslims4 are the most common 
targets. The violence occurred mostly in the few areas of  Kosovo where minority ethnic groups and 
Kosovo Albanians live close to each other (S/2000/177, 2000: para. 49). The March 2004 violence 
occurred in the ethnically divided Mitrovica region of  northern Kosovo, whereby a total of  19 
persons died, of  whom 11 were Kosovo Albanians and 8 were Kosovo Serbs, and 954 persons were 
injured in the course of  the clashes. “Approximately 730 houses belonging to minorities, mostly 
Kosovo Serbs, were damaged or destroyed. In attacks on the cultural and religious heritage of  
Kosovo, 36 Orthodox churches, monasteries and other religious and cultural sites were damaged or 
destroyed” (S/2004/348, 2004: para. 3). Inter-ethnic tensions remain quite serious questions and 
complicate peaceful development mostly in the area along the Ibër/Ibar River, where the situation 
remains fragile and both the Kosovo Serbian and Kosovo Albanian communities react instantly to 
what they consider a provocation by the other community (S/2011/43, 2011: para. 22). In recent 
decades, ethnic tensions have erupted not only into violent clashes between members of  
communities, but also into violence aimed at the international presence in the area (S/2012/72, 2012: 
para. 3 – para. 16).  
 
4. The Mode of  Transition – Domestic and International Conditions 
                                                          
4 This group is officially called Bosniaks in Kosovo 
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As Doyle and Sambanis put it, “[E]ffective transitional authority that governs how peacekeeping, 
peace-building and peace enforcement are exercised must be designed to fit the case if  it is going to 
succeed in establishing a self-sustaining peace” (Doyle, Sambanis 2006: 321). The mode of  transition 
is generally understood as the most important element of  transition. It carries both dependent and 
independent variables that define the whole process of  transition. The mode determines and 
modulates the schema for the whole interaction between international actors and their domestic 
counterparts: “The interim government usually operates within a context of  volatility and political 
vulnerability marked by uncertainty, anxiety and high expectations concerning the future distribution 
of  power and loyalties” (Shain, Linz 1995: 128).  
The mode of  transition has some remarkable limitations. The problem could be found in its 
limited focus on variables influencing the process of  transition in a particular territory. It pays too 
much attention to explaining how domestic variables influence the process of  transition. However, it 
is very reluctant to explain the influence of  international actors on the process. Tansey in his book 
Regime–Building: Democratization and Interim Administration argues that the contemporary mode of  
transition needs to be revised to incorporate the important influence of  the international and 
domestic context and internal and external fluctuations (Tansey 2009: 4). In this respect, 
international actors are a part of  the transitional governance and thus they are directly involved in 
the central processes of  regime change. External elites explicitly promote the development of  
democratic regimes, interact with local actors, and often play roles that in more conventional cases 
are associated with domestic actors (Tansey 2009: 4).  
The cooperation between all the parties taking part in the transitional process and the resulting 
international influence on the transition is not a one-way process. Each of  the actors in transition 
plays a different role. Their behavior is therefore conditioned by their origin, their history, and even 
their different accountabilities to individual parties. International administrators are fully 
subordinated and obligated to international bodies, while domestic elites have to meet the 
expectations of  the local population. Furthermore, each of  these parties in question shares 
responsibility for the consequences. It is not possible for only one party in this relationship to bear 
all the responsibility and to accept all the blame for any negative outcomes. 
The IA possesses a high level of  power. The process itself  is composed of  a number of  
activities that significantly change political and social conditions in a transitional territory. The impact 
of  the IAs on local elites and political structures can be visible in the ability of  the IA to affect a 
trajectory over the social development and social behavior of  all influential elites. The IA is entitled 
by its extensive power. Once the transitional mechanism is implemented, the system of  transition has 
full control over domestic elites and actors, and can take primary control of  the whole of  the 
development and the implementation of  political wishes.  
The influence of  an IA is not necessarily positive. The implementation of  democratic principles 
can also lead to deadlock in the transition process. Another example concerns international 
administrators as personnel from different international organizations. Their different origins, 
traditions and values can add tensions to the process. In some cases, these may undermine the 
achievement of  standards, the setting of  goals, and even the reaching of  particular stages in the 
process of  transition. International administrators cannot, without close cooperation with domestic 
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elites, guarantee the problem-free transformation of  a region to a fully democratic political state. 
Even after the withdrawal of  the international presence, there is still a significant degree of  danger. 
The territory can return to its authoritarian past or adopt a form of  hybrid regime where the 
institutions of  democracy are shown to co‐exist with non‐democratic behaviour, resulting in a form 
of  “competitive authoritarianism” that has more in common with authoritarian than democratic rule 
(González F.E., King D. 2004: 193–210).  
 
5. Case Application – Two 
Kosovo provides an explanatory example of  an extremely divided society within which it is almost 
impossible to create a collective identity. The mode of  transition in Kosovo has been particularly 
influenced by a triumvirate of  main actors involved in the process. This triangulation has driven 
very-difficult-to-control flows inside the model of  IA in Kosovo, which has simultaneously led to 
numerous deviations inside the internal flows of  the schema. As has already been argued, these 
inconsistencies in the mode of  transition have not only arisen because of  conflicting ethnic interests. 
 The question of  Kosovo’s final status was the second driving force creating such deviations. 
The transitional period is full of  various events that reflect a distance between the domestic elites 
and international administrators. The basic strategy of  the international community in respect to 
Kosovo was to implement a system of  affirmative action related to a system of  representative 
participation. It seems quite ironic that the system was criticized by a high representative5 who noted 
that the recruitment of  minorities has too often been seen as a question of  filling a quota rather than 
one of  providing meaningful participation (S/2005/635, 2005: para. 22). The system represents a 
quasi-hybrid system that proposes a combination of  proportional representation with a system of  
reserved positions. Such a system relates to the problem of  conflicting ethnic interests, which was 
analyzed in the previous case application. In Kosovo, this system was implemented in many 
segments, which included provisional institutions for self-government as well as those relating to 
employment. This strategy, however, accentuated a deep divergence between domestic elites on one 
side and between domestic elites and international community on the other one.  
The problem of  the Kosovo Serbs is closely connected to Belgrade's position. On the one hand, 
representatives of  the Kosovo Serb community have constantly undermined the IA structure and 
looked for support from Belgrade. On the other, Albanian leaders have followed and supported the 
strategy of  the IA mission. Belgrade has always been perceived as a third element in the mode of  
transition that has played a very important role. Despite Belgrade’s official support for action and 
policies of  Interim administrators, it also provided assistance to the parallel structure (S/2006/361, 
2006: Annex 1, para. 8) in Northern Kosovo. Belgrade was quite unclear about its true position and 
sent numerous mixed signals to Serbian representatives and the Serbian minority with respect to 
participation in elections (S/2004/907, 2004: Annex 1) and the Kosovo Serb presence in the 
provisional governmental structures created by UNMIK in Kosovo.  
                                                          
5 Kai Eide - the Special Envoy to the UN Secretary General 
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However, the poor participation of  local personnel in transitional institutions could be observed 
on both sides, which minimized the prospect of  a successful transition. The Serbian influence on 
Kosovo Serbs increased continually. The boycott of  Kosovo Serbs and their minimal participation in 
transitional institutions could be credited to their loyalty to Belgrade as well as to fears that the quick 
achievement of  benchmarks would accelerate the process towards a final status for Kosovo which 
they would find unfavorable. The UN reported that with regard to the implementation of  standards 
very little was achieved. In spite of  a new institutional political framework being established, the 
system was still influenced by political interests and ethnic identity (S/2005/635, 2005). On the other 
hand, Kosovo Albanians decreased their participation in the transitional institutions and in the 
election system mostly because of  uncertanty and an unclear strategy relating to the final status of  
the region.  
The third element driving deviation inside the mode of  transition can be credited to the 
formulation of  Resolution 1244 itself. The vagueness of  UN Resolution 1244 provided for no 
concrete final settlement with respect to Kosovo's status.  UN Resolution 1244 invested the IA with 
the power to provide the people of  Kosovo with substantial autonomy (S/RES/1244, 1999: 
para.10). The IA was deployed to establish and oversee the development of  provisional democratic 
self-governing institutions which would ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all 
inhabitants of  Kosovo (S/RES/1244, 1999: para. 10). The situation in 2007 and 2008 provided an 
example of  deviational turmoil inside the mode of  transition that has its roots in the basic document 
of  the mission. The existence of  an unclear strategy relating to the final status of  Kosovo intensified 
the tensions between domestic elites, which were further transformed into escalating ethnic violence 
in the streets.   
The situation became more complicated after the Contact Group was brought into being. The 
Contact Group was divided about the question of  the final status of  Kosovo, Russia supporting 
Belgrade’s view and the US and Great Britain supporting independence for Kosovo. In 2007, a UN 
report recommended that Kosovo should become an independent state with supervision under the 
auspices of  the international community (S/2007/168, 2007). The report described Kosovo as a 
limbo state that could not continue under the defined strategy: “[D]enying or delaying a resolution to 
the issue of  Kosovo’s status risked challenging not only its own stability but the peace and stability 
of  the region as a whole” (S/2007/168, 2007: para. 4). The proposal was, however, rejected by the 
Republic of  Serbia. In reaction to the proposed plan, the National Assembly of  the Republic of  
Serbia adopted a resolution (Serbian Government 2007a) declaring Kosovo–Metohija6 an integral 
part of  the territory of  Serbia. The UN proposal that Kosovo should become an independent state 
was rejected as unlawful and illegitimate (Serbian Government 2007b).  
The following Declaration of  Independence created another disturbance in the mode of  
transition and further polarized the communities. Serbia viewed the declaration as a unilateral 
intention to secede by force from the territory of  Serbia, which did not have any legal status either in 
Serbia or in the international legal order: “The Kosovo Serbs (…) held daily, largely peaceful protests 
in several areas in Kosovo where Kosovo Serbs lived, including northern Mitrovicë/Mitrovica, 
                                                          
6 the term is used by the Republic of  Serbia for Kosovo. 
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Graçanicë/Gračanica, Kamenicë/Kamenica and Shtërpcë/Štrpce” (S/2008/211, 2008: para. 6–7). 
The transformation of  competencies from the UNMIK in Kosovo to EULEX in accordance with 
the transformation strategy was obstructed by Belgrade. Belgrade stated that Serbia would never 
recognise Kosovo’s independence nor the presence of  EULEX unless they had received prior UN 
Security Council approval (Serbian Government 2008).  
After diplomatic talks brokered by the EU, Pristine and Belgrade showed a willingness to 
normalize their relations. Since then, there has been a great deal of  diplomatic pressure on both sides 
and a new shift can be observed in recent diplomatic achievements such as common agreement 
on numerous sensitive issues (S/2012/603, 2012: para. 14)7 and a few positive steps towards the 
implementation of  agreements on regional cooperation and the joint management of  crossing points 
(S/2012/818, 2012: para. 18). 
 
6. Conclusion 
As has been shown, conflicting ethnic interests have quite deep roots in Kosovo society and have 
manifested a tendency to increase since the arrival of  the international presence in the area. Were 
the conditions and strategy of  the transition able to transform individual interests into a 
collective identity? As has been indicated, conflicting ethnic interests present a significant variable 
in Kosovo and still present a very serious impediment to future development in the wake of  the EU-
brokered landmark accord. Causality can be observed in the flows running inside the mode of  
transition, where intense conflicts of  ethnic interest have a direct negative impact on local 
participation with a resulting influence on the mode of  transition. Indisputably, the strategy of  
transformation covers a large number of  possible alternatives; however, the dynamic inside the mode 
of  transition demonstrated that conflicting ethnic interests limited local participation and that the 
vacuum surrounding the final status of  Kosovo accelerated a dynamic process leading to negative 
consequences. It has been indicated that the mode of  transition based on western democratic 
principles has had a minimal effect on the creation of  a collective identity and that conflicting ethnic 
interests are still very much in evidence. This lack of  real effectiveness on the part of  the IA has 
been a catalyst for other factors8 that have complicated the implementation of  strategies and made 
the defined standards more difficult to achieve. 
It has been shown that the interim administrators have partially failed in their aim to transform 
individual interests into a collective identity. Kosovo Serbs still perceive themselves to be an inherent 
part of  the Republic of  Serbia and refuse to incorporate themselves into Kosovo society, strongly 
rejecting the institutions of  the Republic of  Kosovo (S/2012/818, 2012: para. 8). This dynamics has 
led to a vicious circle within which each element influences the others and each element has a direct 
impact on the others. Moreover, institutions of  the transitional structure were not fully able to 
resolve the competition between ethnic identities. Conflicting ethnic interests have become a part of  
                                                          
7 For details see S/2012/603, para. 14 – a list of  important agreement areas.  
8 This paper is strictly narrowed to analyze three elements influencing the mode of  transition itself. This paper does not 
pay any attention to due to limited space. The broader analysis is a part of  the dissertation.  
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day-to-day life and are deeply institutionalized in the present system. They still represent a very 
important factor that has contributed to deviations inside the mode of  transition and the anomalies 
in international structures, institutions and transitional structures in Kosovo. Recent talks between 
Belgrade and Pristine under the auspices of  the UN and the EU indicate the continuing divisions 
inside Kosovo society. The talks were accompanied by a number of  incidents and tensions on the 
ground (S/2013/72, 2013: para. 9). 
Could Resolution 1244 itself  be in some way accountable for internal deviations in the 
mode of  transition and have contributed to the obstruction of  the implemented schema? 
The transitional system was continuously exposed to a keen criticisms pointing at the need to build a 
stronger socio-political responsibility and higher “participatory approaches” throughout effective 
local institutions that should not have been a “substitute for top-down decision-making by 
international missions” (Narten 2006: 159). The deteriorating situation during the whole transitional 
process demonstrates that the escalation of  ethnic conflicts and tensions was in direct relation to the 
insecurity and uncertainty with regard to the future development and final status of  Kosovo. It is 
argued that the lack of  clarity of  Resolution 1244 concerning Kosovo´s final status could be a partial 
reason for the strong tensions and fluctuations in the mode of  transition. The uncertainty with 
regard to the future status of  Kosovo was a very important factor that undermined the achievement 
of  local ownership, for it is impossible to own something the nature of  which one cannot imagine or 
comprehend beforehand (Knoll 2005: 637–660). The different interests of  the Great powers during 
the formulation of  Resolution 1244 together with a lack of  strong action, the absence of  a clear 
mandate and the open question of  Kosovo´s final status deeply anchored conflicting ethnic interests 
into Kosovo society. This consequently jeopardized subsequent strategies for creating the institutions 
of  self-government in Kosovo. Moreover, the vagueness of  Resolution 1244 about Kosovo´s final 
status opened up a space for very dangerous maneuvers and obstructions on the part of  Belgrade, 
which has made the process of  transition, in some phases, quite complicated. 
To what extent did the domestic communities in Kosovo modify the unfavorable 
conditions undermining the mode of  the transitional system? During the whole process of  
transition, the IA was faced with one of  the most polarized societies in the world. The lack of  a 
collective identity has very deeply polarized the members of  all communities and has complicated 
the achievement of  benchmarks. The polarization inside Kosovo´s society has been strengthened by 
very strong conflicting ethnic interests, which in the end have contributed to the confounding 
behavior of  all communities. The polarization and the deterioration in the mode of  transition have 
to be viewed from a broader perspective and are closely related to conflicting ethnic interests. The 
influence of  one group has an inevitable impact on the behavior of  the other group and the 
behavior of  international actors. Belgrade has always played a much too important role in forming 
public opinion among Kosovo Serbs and influencing the behavior of  the key elite members of  the 
community. The limited mandate and weak structural competencies of  the UNMIK in Kosovo 
enable Belgrade, in many situations, to influence the trajectory of  the settlement. The strong 
divisions driving disputes between key members of  community elites has limited the transformation 
of  the society and the participation of  community members in provisional institutions in Kosovo. It 
is manifest that the society in Kosovo is still strongly divided in spite of  the clear aims of  the 
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transitional authority. Moreover, the situation after the Declaration of  Independence significantly 
contributed to strong political tensions in Northern Kosovo (S/2010/562, 2010: para. 17). As has 
been demonstrated, a missing collective identity has, in many cases, been a cause of  escalating 
violence, serious ethnic clashes, and security fears (S/2012/818, 2012: para. 23).   
This study has shown that the UNMIK and the mode of  transition itself  have been 
continuously undermined by key phenomena that are still very deeply rooted in Kosovo society. This 
work argues that despite the approaching end to supervised independence (S/2012/603, 2012: para. 
7), conflicting ethnic interests9 still present a serious issue with respect to future development in 
Kosovo. The recent EU-brokered landmark accord indicates a shift in understanding. It is very 
probable that a revised perception of  the future coexistence of  ethnic communities in Kosovo and 
the serious problem of  a lack of  collective identity among these communities will force the 
international community to maintain its deployment in the area for a very long time to come.  
 
List of  Abbreviations 
IA  Interim Administration 
SG  the Secretary General 
SC  the Security Council 
UNMIK the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo 
UN  the United Nations 
TA  Transitional Administration 
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